Wednesday, 26 June 2013

More, More Aquinas on Temperance


I have another friend who is even more wealthy than the one mentioned in the previous post. But, this one is temperate  One would never know she is a multl-millionaire. She is not into status, or clothes, or jewelry, and her interior life is rich. 

Why the difference in the two women? Grace, the mystery of God's discernment; cooperation with grace; practice of simplifying one's life; not identifying with wealth; a sense of self which is not based on the material, but on the spiritual.

This woman has the virtue of temperance. The other was blind to this virtue. A mystery of grace...

As stated above (123, 11; 61, 3), a principal or cardinal virtue is so called because it has a foremost claim to praise on account of one of those things that are requisite for the notion of virtue in general. Now moderation, which is requisite in every virtue, deserves praise principally in pleasures of touch, with which temperance is concerned, both because these pleasures are most natural to us, so that it is more difficult to abstain from them, and to control the desire for them, and because their objects are more necessary to the present life, as stated above (Article 4). For this reason temperance is reckoned a principal or cardinal virtue.
Reply to Objection 1. The longer the range of its operation, the greater is the agent's power [virtus] shown to be: wherefore the very fact that the reason is able to moderate desires and pleasures that are furthest removed from it, proves the greatness of reason's power. This is how temperance comes to be a principal virtue.
Reply to Objection 2. The impetuousness of anger is caused by an accident, for instance, a painful hurt; wherefore it soon passes, although its impetus be great. On the other hand, the impetuousness of the desire for pleasures of touch proceeds from a natural cause, wherefore it is more lasting and more general, and consequently its control regards a more principal virtue.
Reply to Objection 3. The object of hope is higher than the object of desire, wherefore hope is accounted the principal passion in the irascible. But the objects of desires and pleasures of touch move the appetite with greater force, since they are more natural. Therefore temperance, which appoints the mean in such things, is a principal virtue.