The Dark Night of the Soul, which includes the Dark Night of the Senses and the Spirit, removes the domination of the passions in the soul.
As long as a person is tossed to and fro by their passions, there can be no spiritual growth.
Some of this post is a repetition of earlier ones on the Dark Night and the passions. But, because I have met so many young people under the age of fifty, who have never in their life heard any teaching on the passions or emotions, I thought it was time to repeat some words of Garrigou-Lagrange.
The capital sins are related to inordinate passions, and the predominant fault can be based on the passions. One of the things in the dark night times is the removal of fears, false idols, and anything which ties one to the passions.
THE PASSIONS FROM THE PSYCHOLOGICAL POINT OF VIEW
St. Thomas, who follows Aristotle and St. John Damascene, defines
passion thus: "A movement of the sensitive appetite when we imagine
good or evil. . . . A passion is properly to be found where there is
corporeal transmutation." (2)
When we say that it is a movement of
the sensible appetite, common to man and animal, a distinction is made
between passion and a movement of the spiritual will, called the
rational appetite. Neither must the movement of the sensible appetite
be confused with corporeal movements: for example, with the beating of
the heart that follows it. These movements of the sensitive appetite
which are the passions manifestly exist in the animal: for example,
when it desires its food, and in it passion is now under a mild form,
as in the dove or the lamb, now under a violent form, as in the wolf,
the tiger, or the lion.
Following Aristotle, St. Thomas
distinguishes and classifies the different passions in a remarkable
manner. He distinguishes first of all the concupiscible appetite,
which inclines one to seek for sensible and delectable good and to
flee injurious evil, and the irascible appetite, which inclines one to
resist obstacles and, in spite of them, to obtain a difficult good.
There are animals and men dominated by the irascible appetite, others
dominated by the concupiscible.
In the concupiscible appetite, in
regard to sensible good which attracts, three passions are
distinguished: the love of this sensible good, whether it is present
or absent; the desire of this good, if it is absent; the joy, if it is
present. These movements of the sensible appetite are seen in the
animal to which food is brought or from which it is removed.
On the
contrary, in reference to evil to be avoided, we distinguish in the
concupiscible, hatred, aversion, and sadness. Thus the lamb
instinctively flees from the wolf.
In the irascible appetite, in
reference to the good difficult to obtain (bonum arduum), there
are the two passions of hope and of despair or dejection, according as
this good appears obtainable or unobtainable. And in this same
appetite, with regard to injurious evil to be repulsed, there is
audacity and fear, according as this evil is easy or difficult to
repulse, and also anger, if it is a question of a present evil to be
surmounted or an insult to be avenged.
In the spiritual will there
are analogous movements of love, desire, joy, hope, and so on, but
these are of an immaterial order, whereas the passion is always
accompanied by a movement of the organism, because of the fact that
the sensible appetite is united to an organ.
Among all the passions,
the first of all, presupposed by all the others, is sensible love: for
example, in the animal, love of the food that it needs. From this love
are born desire, joy, hope, audacity, or hatred of what is contrary,
aversion, sadness, despair, fear, anger.(3)
From what we have said,
it is evident that passion, as it has been defined, is not always
lively, vehement, and dominant. However, many modern authors apply the
term "passion" to a particularly intense movement of the sensible
appetite and reserve "emotion" to others that are less strong.
PASSION FROM THE MORAL POINT OF VIEW
From the
moral point of view, the passions have been widely discussed. The
partisans of the morality of pleasure have said that all passions are
good, as the legitimate expansion of our nature. This justification of
the passions is found among both ancient and modern writers.
The
Stoics, on the contrary, condemned the passions, saying that they are
a movement which, opposed to right reason, troubles the soul.
According to them, the wise man must suppress the passions and reach
impassibility.
Aristotle, followed by St. Thomas, states more
profoundly that the passions or emotions, considered as such, are
morally neither good nor bad, but become morally good if they are
aroused or regulated by right reason and the will which utilizes them
as powers, or they become morally bad if they are not conformable to
right reason. Their morality depends on the intention of the will,
which is always either good or bad, according as it bears or does not
bear on a worthy end. Thus, anger may be holy or, on the contrary,
unreasonable. Christ willed to show holy indignation when driving the
vendors from the Temple and overturning their tables.(4) Likewise, in
Gethsemane Christ, who was about to expiate all our sins, willed to be
sorrowful even unto death to make us understand the sorrow we should
have for our own sins.
Therefore, if the passions or emotions are
regulated, moderated by right reason, they are morally good; they are
forces to be used in the service of virtue: for example, courage,
which is a virtue, makes use of hope and audacity while moderating
them. Likewise modesty, which is a laudable emotion, helps the virtue
of chastity, and that other emotion, known as sensible pity toward the
unfortunate, renders easy for us the exercise of the virtue of mercy.
The act of virtue, St. Thomas says,(5) is even more meritorious when
it makes good use of the passions in view of a virtuous end.
It is
clear, in fact, that God has given us our sensible appetites, as He
has given us our exterior senses and imagination, as He has given us
our two arms, that we may use them in view of a moral good. Thus
utilized, the passions when well regulated are powers. And whereas the
so-called antecedent passion, which precedes judgment, clouds the
reason, as happens in the fanatic or the sectarian, the so-called
consequent passion, which follows the judgment of right reason
illumined by faith, increases merit and shows the power of good will
for a great cause. With this meaning, Pascal could say: "Nothing great
is accomplished without passion," without this flame of sensibility,
which is like the radiation of zeal or the ardor of love of God and of
neighbor. This zeal consumed the hearts of the saints and showed
itself in their courage and endurance.
But the inordinate or
undisciplined passions become vices because of their inordinateness:
sensible love becomes gluttony or luxury; aversion becomes jealousy,
envy; audacity becomes temerity; fear becomes cowardliness or
pusillanimity.
When these inordinate passions precede the judgment
of reason, they trouble it and can diminish responsibility, merit, and
demerit; when they follow judgment and are willed, they increase the
malice of the act.(6) Then instead of being powers in the service of
goodness, they are in the service of perversity. Whereas in the souls
of the saints, of missioners, and of martyrs, a perfectly ordered
passion is a power that manifests and serves the love of God and
neighbor; in the soul of a criminal, it manifests and serves unbridled
self-love.
In my short life, I see two passions which seem to be so common in people, especially the young, but not merely so. These are fear and misplaced love. Fear keeps one from facing one's faults-one is afraid to be known. Inordinate or misplaced love keeps one from being open to the love of God.
I suggest going back to the Dark Night series for more.
to be continued...
