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Tuesday 28 January 2014

Children can and do go to hell....pray for lax Catholic parents......

An Irish Gateway to Hell and Purgatory-St. Patrick's Purgatory, wiki
Pope Pius XII addressed a group of school children on May 2, 1954. The talk centered on the realities of sin, the devil, and the love of Jesus for them. The talk was almost prophetic, when you consider what is happening to our children today. The following is an excerpt of his talk.

"We wish above all to express to you the fatherly concern that fills Our heart when We see reflected in your eyes the innocence that charms men, enraptures the angels, and moves even the Heart of God. Who can tell, indeed, what may someday become of this easy, blithe gladness of yours? It might be possible-and our souls are saddened merely to think of it-that the sun of your childhood will be darkened by menacing clouds.

"Do you remember how, when Jesus walked the streets of Judea, the little children ran to honor Him and their mothers presented them to Him, overcoming the opposition of those who feared that they would bother Jesus? Today, alas, there is great danger that this will not continue to be the case, and that some children will no longer be, as before, the little friends of Jesus.

"How many little ones today are in danger of being poisoned by the serpent of Hell? Who would be able, then, to recognize them? For these, Holy Church would weep, and it would not be easy in this case to comfort the sorrowing mother and dry her anguished tears. This venomous serpent encircles the world, disguised in many ways, and now he seems to be trying to attack children in particular, to snatch them from Jesus and estrange them from the priesthood and the Church. Today there is cause for great fear that children will be struck, wounded and their souls killed.

"Watch out, dear children, While you walk in the streets or play the games of childhood; when you watch shows that progress has brought even into your own homes, watch out! Often the serpent may be hidden there to strike you, to snatch you from Jesus. At the first sign of danger, cry out, run to your mother right away, and above all, to your heavenly Mother, to Mary, who has at her command the power of God and is always near you. Call on your Guardian Angel to enlighten and sustain you."

And, a Chinese Dante makes it clear that natural law speaks to the heart of all humans about sin and punishment.

Celebration of St.Thomas Aquinas

I have posted and re-posted many of my articles on Thomas Aquinas in order to help us all celebrate his day today...just scroll down and enjoy.
This celebration makes this day, I think, my biggest blog post day ever.

Twenty-seven and counting...........

Read, study, think, reflect, pray, act.

Be a Catholic.

Doctors of the Church 2:74 Aquinas Day

More Aquinas on Temperance; The Entitlement Culture Does Not Get This...

I have written here on the Cardinal Virtues before, but I want to highlight Aquinas. We need to be absolutely clear as to the importance of these virtues, given in baptism, but needing the cooperation of our will and the grace of the sacraments. 2:2;141 is the reference for the next two postings.

Temperance is connected to humility and reason. We remember our end, which is eternal life with God. All things on earth need to be seen in the light of our end.

As stated above (1; 109, 2; 123, 12), the good of moral virtue consists chiefly in the order of reason: because "man's good is to be in accord with reason," as Dionysius asserts (Div. Nom. iv). Now the principal order of reason is that by which it directs certain things towards their end, and the good of reason consists chiefly in this order; since good has the aspect of end, and the end is the rule of whatever is directed to the end. Now all the pleasurable objects that are at man's disposal, are directed to some necessity of this life as to their end. Wherefore temperance takes the need of this life, as the rule of the pleasurable objects of which it makes use, and uses them only for as much as the need of this life requires.

What do we really need? Why do we think we have so many needs? Entertainment is a need which is over-blown in our society. If we are following the road to perfection, we embrace suffering and do not run away from it into attitudes of entitlement.

Reply to Objection 1. As stated above, the need of this life is regarded as a rule in so far as it is an end. Now it must be observed that sometimes the end of the worker differs from the end of the work, thus it is clear that the end of building is a house, whereas sometimes the end of the builder is profit. Accordingly the end and rule of temperance itself is happiness; while the end and rule of the thing it makes use of is the need of human life, to which whatever is useful for life is subordinate.

Beauty is a need, but not in excess, as in the pursuit of pleasure. We have been conditioned in the past fifty years to think that we need things we do not need.

Rest is a need, but not in excess. I note that the Tyburn nuns have 45 minutes or so of recreation a day. And, no vacations. Why is their need so different from most of the world's needs?

They exhibit temperance and balance. They live moderately, or even less than moderately. In this order, there is a happiness, a contentment which flows out of self-denial.

Reply to Objection 2. The need of human life may be taken in two ways. First, it may be taken in the sense in which we apply the term "necessary" to that without which a thing cannot be at all; thus food is necessary to an animal. Secondly, it may be taken for something without which a thing cannot be becomingly. Now temperance regards not only the former of these needs, but also the latter. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 11) that "the temperate man desires pleasant things for the sake of health, or for the sake of a sound condition of body." Other things that are not necessary for this purpose may be divided into two classes. For some are a hindrance to health and a sound condition of body; and these temperance makes not use of whatever, for this would be a sin against temperance. But others are not a hindrance to those things, and these temperance uses moderately, according to the demands of place and time, and in keeping with those among whom one dwells. Hence the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 11) says that the "temperate man also desires other pleasant things," those namely that are not necessary for health or a sound condition of body, "so long as they are not prejudicial to these things."

One time, long ago, a rich woman said to me that she needed more holidays than the poor because being rich was so stressful! She felt she had duties to the common good, which she did, but could not see the irony that her activities caused her a stress she did not need to endure. She could not see that she was denying a spiritual reality to sink into her life by so much doing.

She was caught up in DOING rather than being. She was a heiress of a large fortune and her doing things was her way of sharing. Some of this was good, but mostly, she could not see that she was causing her own stress and that her spiritual life was atrophying. She had many talents and gifts. Sometimes, those so gifted need to simplify the use of their gifts and let God take control.

Simplicity of life was something she simply could not understand.

Reply to Objection 3. As stated (ad 2), temperance regards need according to the requirements of life, and this depends not only on the requirements of the body, but also on the requirements of external things, such as riches and station, and more still on the requirements of good conduct. Hence the Philosopher adds (Ethic. iii, 11) that "the temperate man makes use of pleasant things provided that not only they be not prejudicial to health and a sound bodily conditionbut also that they be not inconsistent with good," i.e. good conduct, nor "beyond his substance," i.e. his means. And Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xxi) that the "temperate man considers the need" not only "of this life" but also "of his station."

We have too many living in the West like they are rich when they are not. This is the cult of status. The new rich lack culture and manners in the pursuit of doing things the rich do without any concept of noblese oblige. Thomas understood this all very well, coming from a powerful and noble family. He gave it all up. Thank God for his personal sacrifice-for his temperance.

To be continued..

Doctors of the Church 2:73 Aquinas Day

Aquinas Series on Greed and the Virtues of Temperance and Justice

The Last Judgement in the Albi ST Cecile Cathedral in France

To us, it should be obvious that Justice is the virtue which counteracts Greed. But, Greed is not just about money or property. The most common sort of Greediness is the desire for power. 

Here is Thomas on Greed, just a bit, as there is so much more, of course: 2:2:118. This is the section dealing with greediness for money and acquisitions.

Greed have another name and that is Avarice and it is one of the Deadly Sins. Here are people depicted in hell as being boiled in oil for Greed.

Detail of Above

Covetousness denotes immoderation with regard to riches in two ways. First, immediately in respect of the acquisition and keeping of riches. On this way a man obtains money beyond his due, by stealing or retaining another's property. This is opposed to justice, and in this sense covetousness is mentioned (Ezekiel 22:27): "Her princes in the midst of her are like wolves ravening the prey to shed blood . . . and to run after gains through covetousness." Secondly, it denotes immoderation in the interior affections for riches; for instance, when a man loves or desires riches too much, or takes too much pleasure in them, even if he be unwilling to steal. On this way covetousness is opposed to liberality, which moderates these affections, as stated above (117, 2, ad 3, 3, ad 3, 6). On this sense covetousness is spoken of (2 Corinthians 9:5): "That they would . . . prepare this blessing before promised, to be ready, so as a blessing, not as covetousness," where a gloss observes: "Lest they should regret what they had given, and give but little."
Reply to Objection 1. Chrysostom and the Philosopher are speaking of covetousness in the first sense: covetousness in the second sense is called illiberality [aneleutheria] by the Philosopher.
Reply to Objection 2. It belongs properly to justice to appoint the measure in the acquisition and keeping of riches from the point of view of legal due, so that a man should neither take nor retain another's property. But liberality appoints the measure ofreason, principally in the interior affections, and consequently in the exterior taking and keeping of money, and in the spending of the same, in so far as these proceed from the interior affection, looking at the matter from the point of view not of the legal but of the moral debt, which latter depends on the rule of reason.
Reply to Objection 3. Covetousness as opposed to justice has no opposite vice: since it consists in having more than one ought according to justice, the contrary of which is to have less than one ought, and this is not a sin but a punishment. But covetousness as opposed to liberality has the vice of prodigality opposed to it.

Although Thomas notes that Greed is connected to Lust, he puts this sin in the category of a SPIRITUAL MORTAL SIN  rather than a corporal or fleshy sin. It is the desire and the mental pleasure associated with Greed which is the greatest sin. Sadly, for centuries, Greed has hidden in the idea that those who are blessed by God and heaven bound are signed by wealth. Greed can hide as piety and even as a virtue. 

But, it is a spiritual vice. It shrivels the heart and clouds the mind. Temperance, as well as Justice, can counteract Greed. But, to me, the greatest antidote to Greed is voluntary poverty.

The denial of one's self to be attached to goods for the sake of Christ allows one to become objective and breaks the stranglehold of Greed. Such is the modern world, that Greed is glorified by those on the political left and those on the right. 

Greed is self-centeredness gone wild.

Gregory (Moral. xxxi) numbers covetousness among spiritual vices.
I answer that, Sins are seated chiefly in the affections: and all the affections or passions of the soul have their term in pleasure and sorrow, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 5). Now some pleasures are carnal and some spiritual. Carnal pleasures are those which are consummated in the carnal senses--for instance, the pleasures of the table and sexual pleasures: while spiritualpleasures are those which are consummated in the mere apprehension of the soul. Accordingly, sins of the flesh are those which are consummated in carnal pleasures, while spiritual sins are consummated in pleasures of the spirit without pleasure of the flesh. Such is covetousness: for the covetous man takes pleasure in the consideration of himself as a possessor of riches. Therefore covetousness is a spiritual sin.
Reply to Objection 1. Covetousness with regard to a bodily object seeks the pleasure, not of the body but only of the soul, forasmuch as a man takes pleasure in the fact that he possesses riches: wherefore it is not a sin of the flesh. Nevertheless by reason of its object it is a mean between purely spiritual sins, which seek spiritual pleasure in respect of spiritual objects (thus pride is about excellence), and purely carnal sins, which seek a purely bodily pleasure in respect of a bodily object.
Reply to Objection 2. Movement takes its species from the term "whereto" and not from the term "wherefrom." Hence a vice of the flesh is so called from its tending to a pleasure of the flesh, and not from its originating in some defect of the flesh.
Reply to Objection 3. Chrysostom compares a covetous man to the man who was possessed by the devil, not that the former is troubled in the flesh in the same way as the latter, but by way of contrast, since while the possessed man, of whom we read in Mark 5, stripped himself, the covetous man loads himself with an excess of riches.

Here is a bit of Thomas on Temperance and remember that the Cardinal Virtues lie not only in the heart, but in the head. Thomas reminds us of this below. If we are reasonable, we shall fear the Lord.

The Cardinal Virtues, Strasbourg Cathedral
As stated above (I-II, 55, 3), it is essential to virtue to incline man to good. Now the good of man is to be in accordance with reason, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Hence human virtue is that which inclines man to something in accordance with reason. Now temperance evidently inclines man to this, since its very name implies moderation or temperateness, which reason causes. Therefore temperance is a virtue.
Reply to Objection 1. Nature inclines everything to whatever is becoming to it. Wherefore man naturally desires pleasures that are becoming to him. Since, however, man as such is a rational being, it follows that those pleasures are becoming to man which are in accordance with reason. From such pleasures temperance does not withdraw him, but from those which are contrary to reason. Wherefore it is clear that temperance is not contrary to the inclination of human nature, but is in accord with it. It is, however, contrary to the inclination of the animal nature that is not subject to reason.
Reply to Objection 2. The temperance which fulfils the conditions of perfect virtue is not without prudence, while this is lacking to all who are in sin. Hence those who lack other virtues, through being subject to the opposite vices, have not the temperance which is a virtue, though they do acts of temperance from a certain natural disposition, in so far as certain imperfect virtues are either natural to man, as stated above (I-II, 63, 1), or acquired by habituation, which virtues, through lack of prudence, are not perfected by reason, as stated above (I-II, 65, 1).
Reply to Objection 3. Temperance also has a corresponding gift, namely, fear, whereby man is withheld from the pleasures of the flesh, according to Psalm 118:120: "Pierce Thou my flesh with Thy fear." The gift of fear has for its principal object God, Whom it avoids offending, and in this respect it corresponds to the virtue of hope, as stated above (19, 09, ad 1). But it may have for its secondary object whatever a man shuns in order to avoid offending God.Now man stands in the greatest need of the fear of God in order to shun those things which are most seductive, and these are the matter of temperance: wherefore the gift of fear corresponds to temperance also.

Doctors of the Church 2:72 Aquinas Day

Thomas Aquinas Series Continued on Virtues and Perfection

from 1:2;61

Reply to Objection 1. The Philosopher (Aristotle-supert) is speaking of these virtues according as they relate to human affairs; for instance,justice, about buying and selling; fortitude, about fear; temperance, about desires; for in this sense it is absurd to attribute them to God.
Reply to Objection 2. Human virtues, that is to say, virtues of men living together in this world, are about the passions. But the virtues of those who have attained to perfect bliss are without passions. Hence Plotinus says (Cf. Macrobius, Super Somn. Scip. 1) that "the social virtues check the passions," i.e. they bring them to the relative mean; "the second kind," viz. the perfecting virtues, "uproot them"; "the third kind," viz. the perfect virtues, "forget them; while it is impious to mention them in connection with virtues of the fourth kind," viz. the exemplar virtues. It may also be said that here he is speaking of passions as denoting inordinate emotions.

One must be moving into the perfecting virtues, as the true flowering of the virtues happens at the Illuminative State; before that state, there is too much "me" and not enough Christ.

Reply to Objection 3. To neglect human affairs when necessity forbids is wicked; otherwise it is virtuous. Hence Cicero says a little earlier: "Perhaps one should make allowances for those who by reason of their exceptional talents have devoted themselves to learning; as also to those who have retired from public life on account of failing health, or for some other yet weightier motive; when such men yielded to others the power and renown of authority." This agrees with what Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 19): "The love of truth demands a hollowed leisure; charity necessitates good works. If no one lays this burden on us we may devote ourselves to the study and contemplation of truth; but if the burden is laid on us it is to be taken up unde r the pressure of charity."

I smile, because sometimes this "hallowed leisure" is unemployment, serious illness, such as cancer, or alienation from family. God has his ways of perfecting our intellect if we let him do this.

Charity demands that I write this blog, not my own desires, although the two can coincide. Charity demands that to whom something is given it must be given back freely, even in the face of poverty, which is the Face of Christ on the road to Calvary, as Veronica knew.

Reply to Objection 4. Legal justice alone regards the common weal directly: but by commanding the other virtues it draws them all into the service of the common weal, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 1). For we must take note that it concerns the human virtues, as we understand them here, to do well not only towards the community, but also towards the parts of the community, viz. towards the household, or even towards one individual.

Without sounding like Star Trek, the good of the one is the good of the many. Abortion is the opposite of this ideal, as we see to our sorrow. Catholics understand the value of one individual, one, because of the Incarnation, because of the Son of God Who died for all of us.

The socialist and communist agendas deny the good of the one. But, the virtues never forget the community, the household, the one.

Doctors of the Church 2:71 Aquinas Day

Thomas Aquinas Series--

Questions have come to me on the perfection series regarding the flowering of the virtues.

Thomas Aquinas clarifies this issue, and of course, Garrigou-Lagrange is a great Thomist.

Here is one section to chew on today. Unpacking follows in blue. More to come later....

As Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. vi), "the soul needs to follow something in order to give birth to virtue: this something is God: if we follow Him we shall live aright." Consequently the exemplar of human virtue must needs pre-exist in God, just as in Him pre-exist the types of all things. Accordingly virtue may be considered as existing originally in God, and thus we speak of "exemplar" virtues: so that in God the Divine Mind itself may be called prudence; while temperance is the turning of
God's gaze on Himself, even as in us it is that which conforms the appetite to reasonGod's fortitude is His unchangeableness; His justice is the observance of the Eternal Law in His works, as Plotinus states (Cf. Macrobius, Super Somn. Scip. 1).

How extraordinarily beautiful this above section is. God's Divine Mind is Prudence and Temperance is His Looking on Himself. God's Fortitude is His Absolute Unchangeableness (in contradistinction from Islam, where Allah does change), and His Justice is His Eternal Law, and may I add, His Order for the Universe.

Again, since man by his nature is a social [See above note on Chrysostom] animal, these virtues, in so far as they are in him according to the condition of his nature, are called "social" virtues; since it is by reason of them that man behaves himself well in the conduct of human affairs. It is in this sense that we have been speaking of these virtues until now.

Without social virtues, we sink either into tyranny or into anarchy, which both we see coming in greater strength as the Catholic Church weakens from within owing to a lack of holiness.

But since it behooves a man to do his utmost to strive onward even to Divine things, as even the Philosopher declares in Ethic. x, 7, and as Scripture often admonishes us--for instance: "Be ye . . . perfect, as your heavenly Father is perfect" (Matthew 5:48), we must needs place some virtues between the social or human virtues, and the exemplar virtues which are Divine. Now these virtues differ by reason of a difference of movement and term: so that some are virtues of men who are on their way and tending towards the Divine similitude; and these are called "perfecting" virtues

I cannot emphasize enough that these are given in baptism for our individual perfection, which in turn, if acquired, strengthens the Church. I think Fortitude is what is lacking in many Catholics or fallen-away Catholics who state Catholicism is "just too hard". Sadly, some priests give into lowering the bar on holiness and accepting the status quo for so-called "pastoral reasons."

Thus prudence, by contemplating the things of God, counts as nothing all things of the world, and directs all the thoughts of the soul to God alone: temperance, so far as nature allows, neglects the needs of the body; fortitude prevents the soul from being afraid of neglecting the body and rising to heavenly things; and justice consists in the soul giving a whole-hearted consent to follow the way thus proposed. Besides these there are the virtues of those who have already attained to the Divine similitude: these are called the "perfect virtues." Thus prudence sees nought else but the things of Godtemperance knows no earthly desires; fortitude has no knowledge of passion; and justice, by imitating the Divine Mind, is united thereto by an everlasting covenant. Such as the virtues attributed to the Blessed, or, in this life, to some who are at the summit of perfection. I:2;61

The beauty of the words challenge us today to pursue perfection, cooperating with the myriad graces God gives us daily. To me, the imitation of the Divine Mind, the process and the goal, is paramount. What is not known cannot be loved.

Doctors of the Church 2:70 Aquinas Day

On the supposed virtue of anti-intellectualism

With the assistance of Reason, the priests are saved and remain strong and uninjured in the battle. Only a few of them feel the lance of Greed and they are only scratched. Most infamous pestilence that Greed is, she is astounded to see her spears turned away so neatly from her enemies' throats.

And, I state that sloppiness is Sloth.

In the past 30 months, I have had the sad experience of meeting some priests who are anti-intellectual and think it a virtue. These priests, and they number four, are into private revelations, either directly or indirectly involved in charismatic renewal and have an attitude of not going by the book in liturgy, all of these things which they consider virtues.

The problem is, obviously, there seminary training. Three were trained in American seminaries and one in an English seminary.

I cannot speak with them on the level of rational discourse. They are, simply, not interested.

Their attitudes will lead people astray and continue this emphasis on experience in the spiritual life as something over and above the hard work of purification and the virtues.

I am concerned and have registered my concern, to no effect and therefore, have backed off. It is interesting that they are now all working in the same diocese.

Reason has been denigrated in some seminaries. Three of these men have not studied Thomas Aquinas or the other heavy weights in philosophy. They have studied Blessed John Paul II, but take ALL his actions and words as infallible. Oh dear....they do not take GIRM seriously and two out of the four "hate" the Latin Mass. They either have said so bluntly, or act accordingly. I do not understand. Thinking is part of the spiritual life and critical thinking is taking ownership of one's own mind and soul. Emphasizing the experience of religion does not bring one to maturity and obedience.

And from

“I do not think there are many among Bishops that will be saved, but many more that perish.”
St. John Chrysostom, Extract from St. John Chrysostom, Homily III on Acts 1:12.

“The floor of hell is paved with the skulls of bishops.”
St. Athanasius, Council of Nicaea, AD 325 attributed.

It is interesting that Prudentius has Reason fighting Greed. And, I am finding that Greed may be the impetus behind the words and actions, some of which are totally irresponsible, of these four priests. They want position, status, although they would deny this, and popularity. All are in ministries where they are nationally known. This is not good. They point to the case I have made that if one is not orthodox and not in purgation, one is not doing God's work.

One told me to my face that he did not believe in obedience and disregarded it as "not his thing". As a priest in an order, this is serious. Indeed, three of the four priests are in orders. Another said he would not speak against contraception.

Like the famous and most likely false prayer of the Jew, "Thank God, I am not a woman," I say, "Thank God  I am not a priest who does not value the rational." I do pray for priests, but I am not going to pretend we are not in a crisis in the Church regarding the priesthood. I also pray for seminarians, that they may get good, solid, orthodox training.

All who are honest and truthful need to pray in truth and not in sentimentality. We must correct and pray for correction, as souls will go to hell because of priests who do not think like Mother Church or Christ.

“Augustine says in his Rule: ‘Show mercy not only to yourselves, but also to him who, being in the higher position among you, is therefore in greater danger.’ But fraternal correction is a work of mercy. Therefore even prelates ought to be corrected.”
St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica II, II, q. 33, a. 4, Sed Contra.

Doctors of the Church 2:69 Aquinas Day

Thomas Aquinas Series-Sloth continued...and Energetic Teachers

I am eternally indebted to the nuns who taught me in grade school for covering vices and virtues. God bless them all and give them special places in heaven for teaching me and others about the many sins which are connected to sloth: malice, day-dreaming, curiosity, loquacity and instability.

I am daily in awe of how a small group of nuns managed to get these ideas across to fifth and sixth graders preparing for Confirmation, but they did.

I am sorry if some people do not realize some of these things are sins, but they are. We are so used to a sub-human culture, that we are almost immune to shock about these sins. We need to be  made sensitive again.

Here is Aquinas from this source.

Sloth by weighing on the mind, hinders us from doing things that cause sorrow: nevertheless it induces the mind to do certain things, either because they are in harmony with sorrow, such as weeping, or because they are a means of avoiding sorrow.
Reply to Objection 2. Gregory fittingly assigns the daughters of sloth. For since, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 5,6) "no man can be a long time in company with what is painful and unpleasant," it follows that something arises from sorrow in two ways: first, that man shuns whatever causes sorrow; secondly, that he passes to other things that give him pleasure: thus those who find no joy in spiritual pleasures, have recourse to pleasures of the body, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. x, 6). Now in the avoidance of sorrow the order observed is that man at first flies from unpleasant objects, and secondly he even struggles against such things as cause sorrow. Now spiritual goods which are the object of the sorrow of sloth, are both end and means. Avoidance of the end is the result of "despair," while avoidance of those goods which are the means to the end, in matters of difficulty which come under the counsels, is the effect of "faint-heartedness," and in matters of common righteousness, is the effect of "sluggishness about the commandments." The struggle against spiritual goods that cause sorrow is sometimes with men who lead others to spiritual goods, and this is called "spite"; and sometimes it extends to the spiritual goods themselves, when a man goes so far as to detest them, and this is properly called "malice." On so far as a man has recourse to eternal objects of pleasure, the daughter of sloth is called "wandering after unlawful things." From this it is clear how to reply to the objections against each of the daughters: for "malice" does not denote here that which is generic to all vices, but must be understood as explained. Nor is "spite" taken as synonymous with hatred, but for a kind of indignation, as stated above: and the same applies to the others.

Reply to Objection 3. This distinction between sorrow and sloth is also given by Cassian (De Instit. Caenob. x, 1). But Gregory more fittingly (Moral. xxxi, 45) calls sloth a kind of sorrow, because, as stated above (Article 2), sorrow is not a distinct vice, in so far as a man shirks a distasteful and burdensome work, or sorrows on account of any other cause whatever, but only insofar as he is sorry on account of the Divine good, which sorrow belongs essentially to sloth; since sloth seeks undue rest insofar as it spurns the Divine good. Moreover the things which Isidore reckons to arise from sloth and sorrow, are reduced to those mentioned by Gregory: for "bitterness" which Isidore states to be the result of sorrow, is an effect of "spite." "Idleness" and "drowsiness" are reduced to "sluggishness about the precepts": for some are idle and omit them altogether, while others are drowsy and fulfil them with negligence. All the other five which he reckons as effects of sloth, belong to the "wandering of the mind after unlawful things." This tendency to wander, if it reside in the mind itself that is desirous of rushing after various things without rhyme or reason, is called "uneasiness of the mind," but if it pertains to the imaginative power, it is called "curiosity"; if it affect the speech it is called "loquacity"; and insofar as it affects a body that changes place, it is called "restlessness of the body," when, to wit, a man shows the unsteadiness of his mind, by the inordinate movements of members of his body; while if it causes the body to move from one place to another, it is called "instability"; or "instability" may denote changeableness of purpose.